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Abstract
This paper examines the composition of China’s trade from 1980 to 1996, with a focus on
agriculture and a view towards understanding its changing structure relative to other sec-
tors.  We analyze the time series behavior of individual goods at the SITC three-digit level,
categorized into three groups: agricultural commodities, “other primary” commodities, and
manufactures.  We find that agricultural trade has expanded along comparative advan-
tage lines in a very modest way, compared to manufactures and other primary commodi-
ties.Introduction
Over the past decade, the annual U.S. trade balance with China has gone from a small surplus to
a deficit of over $57 billion (in 1998). The mounting trade deficit has resulted in renewed U. S. pressure
to expand access to China’s markets. Recently, there have been intensive U.S.-China discussions over
trade concessions and the related issue of China's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Agricultural trade is at the center of these negotiations as China’s high trade barriers in agriculture are
believed to be partly responsible for the trade deficit.
1
In a typical year, China has neither a large surplus nor a large deficit in its agricultural trade
balance. For instance, in 1995, China ran a relatively small agricultural trade deficit of $1.47 billion
(U.S. dollars) and then in 1996 the balance shifted to become a small surplus, with agricultural exports
exceeding imports by $673 million in that year.
2 Even though its overall agricultural trade balance is
small, China is a significant but erratic trader for certain agricultural commodities such as wheat, maize,
oilseeds, edible oils, tobacco and cotton.
China’s agricultural trade regime has not been liberalized to the  same extent  as  its  trade  in
manufactures (Naughton, 1999; Martin, 1999). So there is great uncertainty as to what might
happen if and when China liberalizes its agricultural trade. Some projections suggest that China will
become a consistent net importer of food (Wang 1997a). Based on its large and growing population and
                                                
1 The trade deficit of $57 billion is the official U.S. figure. China estimates that the deficit is much lower.  Feenstra et. al.
(1998)  find the U.S. trade deficit with China may be smaller than the U.S. official figure, once proper adjustment is made
for China’s exports to the U.S. via Hong Kong.
2  These trade balance  data  are  based  on  China’s  Customs  Statistics,  and  they  are  on  a  calendar  year  basis.  They
underestimate the value of China’s imports because they do not account for agricultural products smuggled from Hong
Kong into China. Apart from the smuggling issue, the trade data must be interpreted carefully because there are alternative
ways to define which commodities make up agricultural trade. For instance, depending on the data source, seafood and
lumber may or may not be included in agricultural trade statistics. For the purposes of this paper, in order to determine
which products are included in China’s agricultural trade, we follow closely the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
classification system. Compared to the USDA, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
includes more commodities in their definition of agricultural trade and thus the FAO’s annual value of exports and value of
imports for China exceeds that reported by the USDA. In Table 1 we also report the trade balance including  “other
agricultural and resource products” such as seafood, leather, forest products, and fabrics.fluctuating grain stockpiles, some fear that China could destabilize world markets after agricultural trade
liberalization (Wan and Anderson, 1990).
Agricultural trade barriers will be a key issue with regard to China’s application to join the
World Trade Organization (WTO). For instance, China's non-tariff trade  barriers (NTBs)  in  grains
(wheat, maize, rice and soybeans) are very controversial. The barriers in grains are not transparent
because China’s state trading in grains is conducted through its Cereal, Oil, and Foodstuffs Importing
and Exporting Corporation (COFCO).  COFCO is one of the world’s largest STEs in agriculture, and
over the past decade, COFCO has imported as much as 17 percent of world wheat traded, and exported
as much as much as 10 percent of the world’s corn.  
The reemergence of China as a significant trading nation in merchandise trade has been described
by West (1993), Lardy (1994), World Bank (1994), Wall, Boke, and Xiangshou (1996), and Naughton
(1996). Greater integration with the global economy began in the mid 1980s and is now recognized as a
fundamental feature of China’s ongoing economic reform. Outside  of  agriculture,  significant  import
tariff reductions have occurred in the past decade. As a measure of openness, China’s nominal value of
exports grew by 13 percent annually from 1980 to 1996. During the same time period, imports grew by
12 percent per year, on average. By 1997, China’s total trade accounted for about 3 percent of world
trade, up from 0.8 percent in 1978.
However, the degree to which China’s door is open to the world is debatable and China may be
less open to foreign trade than initially appears (Naughton, 1996). From 1986 to 1996, China’s growth
in real merchandise trade exceeded growth in real GDP by 2.1 percent, which was not particularly high
by international standards. For instance, during the same time period, growth in real trade less growth
in real GDP was 6.9 percent in Thailand and 4.5 percent in the United States.China’s ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP rose from 13 percent in 1980 to
about 35 percent in 1996, valued at the official exchange rate. However, this ratio may overstate the
relative importance of foreign trade in China’s economy because it is based on the official exchange rate
(Bell, Khor and Kochhar, 1993). If instead, the purchasing power parity (ppp) exchange rate (i.e., real
exchange rate) is used, trade as a percent of GDP has not changed all that much since the mid 1980s.
Using the real exchange rate, China’s trade as a percent of GDP only grew slightly from 6.6 percent in
1986 to 7.1 percent in 1996 (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998).  In relative terms,
India’s trade as percent of GDP grew faster than China’s over this time period, going from 3.9 percent
to 4.5 percent. In comparison, Thailand’s trade as a percent of GDP grew from 14.7 percent to 31.3
percent from 1986 to 1996.
Despite China’s move to lower average tariffs, China continues to restrict imports through a
variety of barriers, including tariff-quotas,  taxes, import  quotas,  import  licenses, and  state  trading
(United States Trade Representative, 1998). In addition, China uses other non-tariff technical trade
barriers such  as  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures.  These  barriers  are  commonly  applied  to
agricultural products. For instance, under the guise of phytosanitary measures, China prohibits imports
of U.S. citrus (United States Trade Representative, 1998).
3
Lardy  (1994)  explains that  the  commodity  composition  of  trade  has  changed  along  with
domestic market reforms, and that trade patterns (especially on the export side) are more
consistent with China’s comparative advantage, compared with the pre-reform and early reform time
periods. China has shifted away from petroleum exports and has increased exports of labor-intensive
                                                
3  In April  1999, the U.S. and China signed a tentative agreement that aims to further open Chinese markets to wheat, beef
and citrus. Prior to the agreement, China had officially banned imports of wheat from the Pacific Northwest region of the
United States and citrus from Florida, Texas and California. These import bans were on the grounds of worries about plant
diseases. (See the Office of the United States Trade Representative press release, April 10, 1999, available at
www.ustr.gov).manufactured goods, to the point where manufactured goods accounted for 85 percent of exports in
1996.  The share of primary commodities in total imports fell from a little over one-third in 1980 to
about one-fifth by 1996.
China’s agriculture has a comparative advantage in labor intensive crops, not grains  (Carter,
Zhong, and Cai, 1996). However,  policy  has  tilted  China’s  agricultural  production  away  from  its
comparative advantage which lies in non-grain activities. Naughton (1996, p. 309) argues that China’s
merchandise exports have shifted to reflect its abundant labor. Has this happened in agriculture? To
what degree is agricultural production and trade becoming more specialized to capture its comparative
advantage in labor intensive food products?
From a conceptual basis, Anderson (1990) argued that China’s economic reform would have a
significant impact on the pattern of agricultural trade. More recently, the same argument has been made
from an empirical perspective by Wang (1997) and Wailes, Fang, and Tuan (1998). Wailes, Fang, and
Tuan (1998) point out that the growth rates for China’s agricultural trade are much slower than for
total trade and consequently the share of agricultural trade in total trade has declined quite dramatically.
However, Wailes, Fang, and Tuan (1998) also argue that China’s agricultural trade has expanded rapidly
and that the pattern of trade roughly adheres to the laws of comparative  advantage.  Alternatively,
Anderson and Strutt (1999) find there has been little growth in China’s food import dependence.
Wang (1997) has argued that China’s agricultural net trade structure is consistent with its
resource endowment.  He  found  that  land-intensive bulk
4  and  processed  intermediate  commodities
account for most of the imports, while labor-intensive horticultural and consumer ready products make
up most of the agricultural exports. However, he based his analysis on 1995 and 1996 data, a period
                                                
4 Wang uses a USDA classification system. Bulk commodities include grains, oilseeds, cotton, raw rubber, and raw
tobacco. Processed intermediate goods include flour, feed, live animals, animal fats and oils, and wool. Horticulturalduring  which  China had  a  temporary  export  blockage  on  grain  exports.  In  late  1994,  the  central
government placed a (temporary) moratorium on grain exports in an effort to control higher domestic
food prices. Rice and maize have traditionally  been net  exports  but  they  shifted  to  a  net  import
situation during the export blockade.
Yiping Huang (1995) has argued that economic reforms in China have generated a significant
impact on agricultural trade. He supported this observation with three points. His first point was that
the  growth  of  exports  outpaced  that  of  GDP  during  the  reform  period.  Second,  he  noted  that
distortions  to  agricultural  trade  have been reduced significantly and  agricultural  trade  experienced
dramatic expansion. Third,  he  noted  that  trade  was  brought  into  conformity  with  the  pattern  of
resource endowments.
Import liberalization has been a theme stressed in many of the above mentioned papers. The
trade reforms that have been implemented in China since 1979 are characterized by demonopolisation
of foreign trade, the phasing out of trade subsidies, replacing of planned-quotas with a tariff- quota
regime (for cereals, soybeans, edible  oils,  and  wool),  progress  toward  currency  convertibility,  and
provisions to attract foreign direct investment. The opening-up has
been a means to promote economic growth and conform with general international trade rules so as to
finally join the WTO.
In general, some significant changes in the nature and extent of government trade interventions
have occurred in China. Prior to the reform period, the allocation of imports and exports were strictly
based on administrative planning and undertaken by only 12 foreign trade corporations. The process of
trade policy reform has involved the introduction of some competition in international trading and the
                                                                                                                                                                      
products include fresh fruits and vegetables. Consumer-ready products include canned fruits and vegetables, fresh and frozen
meat, dairy products, and beverages.gradual development of policy instruments for indirect controls. In 1984, the foreign trade system was
decentralized considerably, when the provincial branches of national foreign trade corporations (FTCs)
were allowed to become independent and each province was allowed to create its own FTCs.  By 1986
there were about 1,200 FTCs, and by the early 1990's they numbered more than 3,000. Although firms
must obtain approval to engage in international trade, this permission has been granted very liberally
and there are now approximately 200,000 firms eligible to engage in foreign trade (Martin and Bach,
1998).
On the other hand, the foreign trade of so-called “strategic products” such as food grains, textile
fibers, and chemical fertilizers, continue to be restricted to specialized national trading corporations
with monopoly trading rights. China’s agricultural trade policy, particularly with
regard  to  grain,  is  characterized by  import/export  licenses and  quotas.    But  even in  the  case  of
agricultural trade, some progress has been made since the 1980s. The overall purpose of this paper is to
measure this progress, relative to trade in manufactures and other primary commodities.
Overview of China’s Agricultural Trade
Prior to the 1978 reforms, almost all of China’s foreign trade was subject to central planning
through a small number of foreign trade corporations. For most  sectors,  the  government  has  since
replaced central planning over trade with import licenses and import and export tariffs. The opening of
China’s economy involved policies to promote exports and attract foreign direct investment. However,
agricultural trade is a major exception to this move towards decentralization of foreign trade. This is
somewhat ironic because agriculture was largely responsible for the initial success of China’s overall
economic reform.In China, rapid economic growth has been accompanied by dramatic changes in the structure of
the economy. Agriculture's share in the total economy has declined from about 40 percent of the GDP
in 1970 to less than 20 percent in 1997. At the same time, agriculture’s share
in total employment declined from 81 percent to 49 percent.
5 The declining role of agriculture in the
economy means the share of agricultural trade in China’s total trade has decreased significantly.  In
1980, agriculture’s share of both exports and imports was around 30 percent, and this declined to about
10 percent in 1997. This is an indication of the improvement in resource allocation among sectors and
the shifting of comparative advantage between agricultural and manufactured products.
In nominal terms, the value of China’s agricultural exports grew at an average rate of 7.1 percent
a year from 1980 to 1996. Agricultural imports grew at an average rate of 5.9 percent over the same
time period.  However, the real value of China’s agricultural trade (exports plus imports) grew at only 2
percent per year, on average, from 1980 to 1996.
The overall composition of China’s agricultural trade is presented in Tables 1 through 3. Tables
1 and 2 report exports and imports, respectively, over the five year 1992-96 time period. For  the
purposes of summarizing these extensive trade data, we have broken the agricultural trade figures in
Tables 1 and 2 into four categories: grains, horticultural products, animal products, and other.
                                                
5 There is considerable variation in estimates of the percent of the labor force engaged in agriculture in China. With a total
population exceeding 1.2 billion, China’s rural population accounts for roughly three-fourths of this number and about
three-fourths of the employed population is rural. The Statistical Yearbook of China 1996 (State Statistical Bureau), reports
that approximately 330 million workers remain in China’s agriculture, which represents over 70% of the rural work force
(450 million in total). However, according to the 1990 National Population Census (conducted on July 1, 1990 and
published by the Population Census Office), the rural labor force and agricultural labor force is underreported in the SSB
Statistical Yearbook. The Census data suggest there could be an additional 80 to 100 million employed in agriculture. This
large discrepancy in the official labor statistics is not widely discussed, with the exception of Banister and Harbaugh
(1992).China’s total agricultural exports were valued at $10.6 billion in 1996. Exports of grains were valued at
$1.4 billion in 1996 (about 13 percent of the total) and edible oilseeds and oils accounted for most of
these grain exports. Maize exports were near zero in 1995 and 1996 (due to the government blockade).
Earlier, in 1992 and 1993, maize exports were much more important and maize alone accounted for 13
percent of total agricultural exports in each of those two years. Prior to the export blockade, grains
accounted for over 27 percent of total agricultural exports.
In 1996, China’s horticultural exports totaled $5.1 billion, up from $3.5 billion in 1992. As a
share of total agricultural exports, horticultural products increased from 39 percent in 1992
to 48 percent in 1996. Fruit and vegetable products are by far  the  most  important  component  of
horticultural exports, followed by “other crops” and vegetables (see Table 1).
Exports of animal products also grew over this 1992 to 1996 time period, from $2.0 to $3.4
billion, and from 22 to 33 percent of total agricultural exports. Unlike, grains and horticultural products,
no one commodity has dominated animal product exports. Processed poultry, processed swine, and
raw wool were the most valuable exports in 1996 but in total these three commodities accounted for
less than 15 percent of animal product exports.Table 1. China's Agricultural Exports, 1992-96, in Millions $US
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Exports 9,189 9,158 11,001 9,902 10,609
Grains 2,491 2,485 3,095 1,343 1,402
Rice 218 253 515 16 112
Wheat 0 8 10 2 0
Maize 1,187 1,154 944 13 30
Barley 0 0 0 0 0
Other Grains 80 58 63 45 45
Grain Products 47 66 80 90 223
Oil Seeds 465 434 665 521 476
Vegetable Oils and Fats 494 511 818 655 515
Horticultural Products
3,572 3,703 4,618 5,300 5,137
Vegetables 637 680 912 849 788
Nuts 132 169 175 172 171
Fruits 123 153 205 252 246
Fruit and Vegetable Products
a
1,296 1,323 1,721 2,207 2,092
Plant Based Fibers 30 34 35 22 20
Tea 362 356 294 275 283
Tobacco Crops 141 135 94 147 111
Other Crops
b
498 511 764 852 803
Other Food Products
c
353 342 418 524 623
Animal Products
2,060 1,934 2,534 2,708 3,484
Live Bovine 74 72 70 69 48
Live Swine 290 272 270 279 294
Live Poultry 23 22 26 29 121
Processed Bovine 127 193 126 169 138
Processed Swine 182 198 277 406 328
Processed Poultry 6 8 13 35 774
Meat Products 86 70 93 110 144
Dairy Products 22 27 23 28 32
Seafood Products
d
4 5 10 7 50
Raw Wool 307 292 456 273 323
Raw Silk 325 245 405 353 313
Other Animal Products 614 531 766 951 919
Other
1,066 1,035 755 551 588
Beverages 623 597 322 189 250
Sugar 226 214 271 313 324
Raw Cotton 217 224 161 49 14
a These include canned, processed and preserved fruits and vegetables
b These include bulbs, tubers, trees, flowers, coffee, spices, seeds, pharmaceutical plant products, gums, saps and other vegetable
materials.
c These include starches, glucose, fructose, pastas, biscuits and animal feed.
d This category does not include total trade in aquatic products (see the appendix).
Source: compiled from China’s Customs Statistics.Table 2. China's Agricultural Imports, 1992-96, in Millions $US
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Imports 4,930 3,408 6,578 11,376 9,936
Grains 2,250 1,514 3,128 6,234 5,145
Rice 39 35 141 434 286
Wheat 1,504 834 961 2,026 1,890
Maize 0 0 0 816 73
Barley 134 128 179 241 304
Other Grains 0 0 0 65 1
Grain Products 38 16 22 40 156
Oil Seeds 31 28 61 107 323
Vegetable Oils and Fats 503 472 1,763 2,505 2,111
Horticultural Products
882 733 821 1,067 1,433
Vegetables 38 23 14 74 69
Nuts 9 8 10 8 12
Fruits 14 22 40 67 185
Fruit and Vegetable Productsa 49 76 104 115 131
Plant Based Fibers 6 14 37 54 35
Tea 3 3 2 2 1
Tobacco Crops 87 51 28 75 61
Other Cropsb 174 168 152 180 200
Other Food Productsc 501 368 434 492 739
Animal Products
1,067 994 1,280 1,747 1,671
Live Bovine 1 2 0 0 0
Live Swine 0 0 0 2 2
Live Poultry 16 11 10 14 15
Processed Bovine 23 38 54 149 100
Processed Swine 8 5 9 13 8
Processed Poultry 0 0 0 1 140
Meat Products 5 5 5 10 6
Dairy Products 59 48 76 58 55
Seafood Products
 d
11 11 8 10 10
Raw Wool 793 716 825 1,018 880
Raw Silk 3 1 9 15 7
Other Animal Products 149 159 285 457 449
Other
731 167 1,348 2,329 1,687
Beverages 255 111 406 901 393
Sugar 28 36 31 9 30
Raw Cotton 447 20 910 1,419 1,264
a These include canned, processed and preserved fruits and vegetables
b These include bulbs, tubers, trees, flowers, coffee, spices, seeds, pharmaceutical plant products, gums, saps and other
vegetable materials.
c These include starches, glucose, fructose, pastas, biscuits and animal feed.
d This category does not include total trade in aquatic products (see the appendix).
Source: compiled from China’s Customs Statistics.Turning to Table 2, we find that China’s agricultural imports grew from $4.9 billion in 1992 to
$9.9 billion in 1996. Grains typically make up over one-half the value of imports, with wheat and
vegetable oils and fats the major imports. In 1992, wheat plus vegetable oils and fats made up over 40
percent of total agricultural exports, with wheat at 30 percent and vegetable oils/fats at 10 percent. In
1996, these two commodity groups still had a 40 percent share of imports, but wheat’s share fell to 19
percent and vegetable oils/fats increased to 21 percent.
From 1992 to 1996, the value of horticultural imports increased from $0.8 to $1.4 billion, but
horticultural’s share in total agricultural imports fell from 18 percent to 14 percent over this period.
Fruits tend to be the most  important  horticultural  import,  but  imports  are diversified  across  this
product grouping. The share of animal products in total imports also fell over this period from 22
percent to 17 percent (valued at $1.7 billion in 1996). Raw wool is by far the most important item in
this group, accounting for over one-half of animal product imports.
The data in Table 2 are the official imports and for some commodities they significantly under-
report the value of trade due to smuggling from Hong Kong. This is especially true for horticultural and
animal products and this issue is discussed below.
We can utilize  Table  3  to  comment  on  Wang’s  (1997b)  finding  that  China’s  pattern  of
agricultural trade is consistent with its resource endowment, importing land intensive bulk commodities
and exporting labor intensive horticultural and consumer ready products. For this purpose, we have
aggregated  China’s  agricultural  trade  into  the  same  categories  defined  by  Wang  (1997b):  bulk
commodities,  consumer  ready  products,  horticultural  and  other  food  products,  and  processed
intermediary products. The make-up of these four categories is explained in the notes to Table 3.Our database for Table 3 covers the 1992 to 1996 time period, whereas Wang’s analysis was
based on 1995 and 1996 data alone. Because of the export blockade, we believe the 1992 to 1994 time
period (before the blockade)  gives  a  clearer  picture  of  the  economic  forces  within  China that  are
influencing trade patterns, but of course it is still a  very  short  time  period.  With  the  information
revealed by these additional years, the conclusions by Wang (1997) are found to be questionable.
Consider the top panel of Table 3. This panel shows that from 1992 to 1994, bulk commodities
were indeed an important component of exports, accounting for anywhere from 25% to 29% of China’s
exports. As expected, there was a sharp decline in the share of bulk commodity exports in 1995 during
the blockade. In 1995 and 1996, China became a net exporter of rice and maize, shifting away from a
net exporter position in the 1992-1994 time period. From 1992 to 1996 there was little change in the
percentage of exports explained by two of the categories; horticultural and other food products, and
processed intermediary products.
The pattern of imports over the 1992 to 1996 time period is shown in the bottom panel of
Table 3. The most striking result associated with these data is the lack of any trend, measured by the
relative import percentages shown in the bottom one-half of the panel. Either bulk commodities or
processed intermediary products account for around 90% of China’s official imports of agricultural
products. The bulk imports are heavily concentrated in grains, vegetable oils, and cotton. In 1996, these
commodities accounted for over 50% of the value of imports. In recent years, China has  been the
world’s  largest importer  of  cotton,  with  annual imports  average  about  800,000  mt.  However,  in
1998/99 China will revert to becoming a net cotton exporter. China also has excessive stockpiles of
grain and cotton. For instance, for 1998/99, China’s cotton stockpile is estimated to be 3.3 mmt, or 40
percent of the world’s stocks.Table 3. China's Agricultural Exports by Category in Millions $US
Agricultural Exports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Bulk Commodities
a 2,698 2,644 2,763 1,034 1,081
Consumer Ready Products
b 2,193 2,281 2,844 3,718 4,279
Horticultural and Other Food Products
c
1,069 1,180 1,559 1,578 1,526
Processed Intermediary Products
d 3,229 3,053 3,835 3,573 3,723
Total 9,189 9,158 11,001 9,902 10,609
Other Agricultural and Resource
Products (OARP)
e
5,613 5,891 7,881 9,526 8,581
Total including OARP 14,802 15,049 18,883 19,428 19,191
Exports as a Percentage of Total
Bulk Commodities
a 29% 29% 25% 10% 10%
Consumer Ready Products
b 24% 25% 26% 38% 40%
Horticultural and Other Food Products
c
12% 13% 14% 16% 14%
Processed Intermediary Products
d 35% 33% 35% 36% 35%
Agricultural Imports
Bulk Commodities
a 2,504 1,206 2,686 5,989 4,610
Consumer Ready Products
b 208 251 324 260 443
Horticultural and Other Food Products
c
118 106 133 296 350
Processed Intermediary Products
d 2,100 1,845 3,435 4,831 4,534
Total 4,930 3,408 6,578 11,376 9,936
Other Agricultural and Resource
Products (OARP)
e
4,088 4,179 4,888 5,570 6,343
Total including OARP 9,018 7,587 11,465 16,946 16,280
Imports as a Percentage of Total
Bulk Commodities
a 51% 35% 41% 53% 46%
Consumer Ready Products
b 4% 7% 5% 2% 4%
Horticultural and Other Food Products
c
2% 3% 2% 3% 4%
Processed Intermediary Products
d 43% 54% 52% 42% 46%
aGrains, seeds, raw tobacco and raw sugar; 
b  Processed meat, dairy products, processed vegetables and fruits; 
c Trees,
flowers, fresh fruits and vegetables; 
d Live animals, flours and meals, gums, saps, oils, hides and skins, raw wool; 
e
Seafood, beverages, leather, forest products, wool yarn and fabrics, cotton yarn and fabrics. Source: compiled from China’s
Customs Statistics.It is somewhat puzzling that the share of land-intensive agricultural exports such as grain and
cotton  has  not  declined,  because China does  not  have a  comparative  advantage  in  land-intensive
commodities. One possible explanation to this puzzle could lie with the domestic “two-tier” pricing
system. The “two-tier” price system may cause trade patterns to diverge from what might be expected
from domestic resource endowments and this possibility has not been
adequately examined in the literature.  The potential trade distortions caused by the domestic pricing
policy also has important implications for future trade policy reform.
More than 95% of China’s marketed cotton and 50% of the marketed grain
6 is procured by the
government. Under the “two-tier” pricing system, COFCO in the case of grain, and China’s National
Textiles Import and Export Corporation (CHINATEX) in the case of cotton, could earn profits from
exporting even when  the  domestic  free market  price  is  lower  than  the  world  price.  COFCO  and
CHINATEX will have an incentive of export grain and cotton whenever the world price PW  > PP
(procurement price) + marketing costs + taxes. This is the case even if the domestic free market price
PF    >  PW  (world  price).  This  was  true  in  1993-94  when  the  domestic  free market  prices  rose
significantly as the slowdown in domestic production created excess domestic demand, and at the same
time, China’s grain exports reached  historical records.  In  1993-94,  domestic  grain  prices  increased
dramatically and the State Grain Bureau could have sold grain into the domestic market to stabilize
prices, but instead they increased  exports  and  reduced imports.  Partly  to  override these  perverse
incentives, the central government eventually imposed a grain export embargo in 1995.  More recently,
                                                
6 As of 1998, China’s government announced a new grain policy that will reduce the role of the free market in grain
purchases. Under the recently announced policy, there will be unlimited purchasing of grain by state agencies from farmers
at "contracted purchasing" prices and "protected" prices. The “protected” prices will be lower than the “contracted” prices
and the “protected” prices will be applicable to above-quota deliveries. Under the new policy, the free market is not allowed
to buy grain from farmers.COFCO has exported corn to world markets, even though world prices  were  below  domestic  free
market prices.
7
Figure 1 displays China’s  net  agricultural  exports  for  four  aggregate  groups:  grains,  animal
products, horticultural products and “other.” Although there are erratic swings in the value of exports,
China continues to be a net exporter of grains (mainly rice and coarse grains). The data in Figure 1 show
exports of horticultural products have grown, and these are products where China probably does have a
comparative advantage. However,  China’s  official  trade  data  do  not  account  for  smuggling.  If  net
exports of horticultural products (in Figure 1) were adjusted for imports smuggled into China, the rise
in horticultural exports on the part of China would not be so strong.
                                                
7 The USTR (1999) reports that most of China’s 4 million metric tons of 1998 corn exports were sold at prices $US 25 to
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Figure 2.  China and Hong Kong:
Net Exports of Fruits and Vegetables: 1970-1997
Source: compiled from FAO trade data
Source: compiled from FAO trade dataTo help illustrate this point with regard to smuggling, Figure 2 shows net exports of fruits and
vegetables from China, Hong Kong, and the two combined. We see from Figure 2  that  both  Hong
Kong’s imports and China’s exports of fruits and vegetables have risen significantly in the
past ten years. However, China’s exports did drop off in 1996 and 1997. If we combine the two, we
find that the 1997 value of net exports into the region was not much different from that of the
late 1980s.
China tends to directly import  bulk  agricultural  commodities, whereas  a  large  share  of  the
processed food and consumer ready products are first imported into Hong Kong and then re-exported
to mainland China. For example, almost all of the U.S. meat, fruit, and vegetable exports to China are
routed through  Hong Kong. Despite  a  relatively  small population  of  only  6  million,  Hong Kong
imported over $14.2 billion in agricultural products in 1996 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS,
1997) more than official imports into mainland China. Hong Kong ranks  as  one  of  the  top  Asian
markets for farm products, and it is the second largest Asian market for U.S. horticultural products. As
an additional measure of its importance, Hong Kong imports 20 percent of U.S. fruit and vegetable
exports and it has been a growing market. However, these imports are not all for domestic consumption
purposes and, in fact, Hong Kong officially re-exports about 55 percent of its agricultural imports.
There is a large two way trade in agricultural products between Hong Kong and China. Hong
Kong’s imports from China include poultry, fruits, vegetables, rice, and nuts. At the same time, Hong
Kong exports substantial amounts of poultry, fruits, vegetables, nuts, oilseeds, and cotton to China. In
addition to the legal shipments from Hong Kong to China, there is a large illegal trade (FAS, 1996;
USTR, 1998; Wong, 1998). Undocumented shipments of fresh fruit may account for up to 70 percent
of Hong Kong’s imports (Wong, 1998). For example, the value of chicken parts smuggled into Chinaalone could amount to over $300 million per year (USTR, 1998). It is difficult to estimate the total
dollar value of undocumented agricultural exports from Hong Kong to China, but it could exceed $1
billion per year.
Changing Trade Patterns
To more fully examine the question of whether or not China’s agricultural exports increasingly
reflect its changing comparative advantage, we study the persistence of trade patterns in this section,
following the methodology of Gagnon and Rose (1995) and Carolan, Singh, and Talati (1998). This
involves an examination the persistence  of  trade  balances  for    three  groups:  agricultural  products,
“other”  primary  products,  and  manufacturing.  It  is  the  relative  trade  performance  of  agriculture
compared to other primary products and manufacturing that is the interesting question. Our trade data
were obtained from Statistics Canada (the World Trade Analyzer) and the  original  source  was  the
United Nations. The raw data were the nominal U.S. dollar values of  China’s exports and imports
annually from 1980 to 1996, disaggregated at the 3-digit level.
Using 3-digit SITC classifications, we first divided the data into 67 agricultural subgroups, 56
subgroups of “other” (i.e., nonagricultural) primary commodities, and 175 manufacturing subgroups.
Examples of goods at this level of disaggregation for agriculture are ‘unmilled wheat’ (SITC  #041),
‘fresh,  chilled  and  frozen  vegetables’  (SITC  #054),  ‘manufactured  tobacco’  (SITC  #122),  and
‘unmanufactured tobacco’  (SITC  #121).  For  other  primary  commodities, examples  include  ‘crude
fertilizer’ (SITC  #271),  ‘coal, lignite  and  peat’  (SITC  #322),  ‘tanned  furskins’  (SITC  #613).  For
manufactures, examples include ‘telecommunications equipment, parts, and accessories’ (SITC #764),‘toys, games, and sporting goods, etc (SITC #894), and ‘passenger motor vehicles excluding buses’
(SITC # 781).
Following Gagnon and Rose (1995), the trade balance figures were then normalized in order to
remove any trend in the data due to systematic factors such as inflation. The normalized trade balance
for commodity group i at time t is defined as:
where for each j (agriculture, other primary products, and manufacturing), Xit is the value of exports of
subgroup i at time t, Mit is the value of imports. The sum of  NBit is zero for any given year, for each j,
j = 1, 2, or 3. After the data were normalized,  the  NB  subgroups  were  then  classified  into  three
categories for each year; namely, trade surplus,  trade  balance,  or  trade  deficit. Subgroups  in  trade
surplus were defined as those goods whose NB was greater than one standard deviation above zero.
Those subgroups with an NB within one standard deviation of zero were classified as being in balance.
Finally, those subgroups with a  value of  NB  more than  one  standard  deviation below  zero  were
classified as being in a trade deficit. As part of this classification procedure, the standard deviation was
computed for each commodity’s NB series.
After normalizing and categorizing
8  each NB  subgroup,  we  constructed  the  two-way  trade
tables, labeled as Tables 7, 8 and 9. These tables provide a breakdown of China’s trade values by the
initial and final trade balance. For the initial period we chose a three year period centered on 1981 and
for the final period the three year mean is centered on 1995. The results in Table 4 suggest that for













i å )´100agriculture, the subgroups that were in  surplus  in  1980-82  accounted for  52.74%  of  the  value of
normalized agricultural trade in 1994-96. Of these goods in surplus, subgroups accounting for 7.02% of
the end-of-period trade moved to a balance, and sub-groups accounting for 1.32% of the end-of-period
trade moved to a deficit. 21.66% of the trade volume moved from balance or surplus to deficit. If we
add  up  the  percentage of  trade  that  is  persistent,  the  diagonal  elements in  Table  4,  we  find  for
agriculture that this sum is 71%.
For “other” primary products, the subgroups that were in surplus in 1980-82 accounted for
40.34% of the value of normalized agricultural trade in 1994-96. Of these goods, 15.74% of (1994-96)
trade moved to balance by 1994-96 and 10.34% moved to a deficit. Adding up the diagonal elements in
Table 5, we find that 44.4% of the trade in manufacturing was persistent, from 1980 to 1996. These
results suggest less persistence in “other” primary products trade compared to agricultural trade.
Turning to manufacturing, in Table 6, the subgroups that were in surplus in 1980-82 accounted
for 31.82% of the value of normalized agricultural trade in 1994-96. Of these goods, 4.93% of (1994-
96) trade moved to balance by 1994-96 and 0.81% moved to deficit. Adding up the diagonal elements in
Table 6, we find that 65.5% of the trade in manufacturing was persistent, from 1980 to 1996. These
results suggest almost as much persistence in manufacturing trade compared to agricultural trade.
As a statistical measure of trade persistence, we can use a transformation of the standard chi-
squared (c) test, Cramer’s C-statistic, suggested by Carolan et. al.. The C-statistic lies between zero
and  one,  with  one  representing  complete  association  between  the  beginning  and  the  ending  trade
balance. From Tables 7, 8 and 9 we find the C-statistic is 0.66 for agriculture, 0.39 for other primary
products, and 0.54 for manufactures. These results suggest there was the least change in  the  trade
balances over the 1980-1996 time period for agriculture, because the C-statistic is relatively high. Formanufacturing and other primary products the results suggest there was relatively more change in the
trade balances over the time period studied, because the C-statistics are lower.
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1980-82 Surplus 44.40 7.02 1.32 52.74
1980-82 Balance 0.32 13.19 20.34 33.86
1980-82 Deficit 0.00 0.00 13.41 13.41
1980-82 Total 44.72 20.22 35.06 100.00
2 86.82
C-statistic 0.66
Number of goods 67
Source: estimated from UN trade data.
                                                
9 Carolan, Singh, and Talati examined U.S. trade with eight Asian countries (Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Indonesia, S. Korea, Singapore, and Thailand). Their estimated C-statistics exceeded 0.5 in only two cases, Hong Kong









1980-82 Surplus 14.26 15.74 10.34 40.34
1980-82 Balance 14.54 3.42 7.95 25.91
1980-82 Deficit 4.43 2.60 26.71 33.74
1980-82 Total 33.23 21.76 45.01 100.00
2 30.98
C-statistic 0.39
Number of goods 56
Source: estimated from UN trade data.









1980-82 Surplus 26.07 4.93 0.81 31.82
1980-82 Balance 9.10 5.43 10.71 25.25
1980-82 Deficit 0.15 8.76 34.03 42.93
1980-82 Total 35.32 19.13 45.55 100.00
2 58.46
C-statistic 0.54
Number of goods 155






































Source: Compiled from UN trade dataRather than just comparing the beginning and ending time periods, we can construct histograms
for agriculture and manufacturing, based on the number of years each subgroup runs a surplus (see
Gagnon  and  Rose).  Figure  3  shows  histograms  for  agriculture,  “other”  primary  products,  and
manufactures. Figure 3 classifies subgroups indicating how many years the subgroup was in surplus.
This means, that a subgroup that was in surplus for each of the 18 years would be in the cell at the
extreme right of the histogram. The histogram for agriculture displays the strongest evidence of bi-
modality, which indicates persistence in trade flows. These histograms are therefore consistent with the
C-statistic results, suggesting more persistence in the composition of agricultural trade, compared to the
other two groups.
Finally, the results of an additional test for association are reported in Table 6. We regressed
NB1994-96 on NB1980-82. The regression coefficients for all three groups are all statistically significant,
but  the  coefficient  for  other  primary  products  is  smaller  than  for  agriculture  or  manufacturing.
Similarly, the R
2 is relatively small for other primary products (0.13) compared to either manufacturing
(0.28) or agriculture (0.49). These results support the conclusion that the trade patterns appear to
change the most for “other” primary products, and the least for agriculture.





















2 0.49 0.14 0.28
Observations 67 56 155Source: estimated from UN trade data.
Summary and Conclusions
The major finding of this paper is that China’s agricultural trade structure  has  not  changed
dramatically since 1980. China's agricultural trade may loosely correspond to the basic principles of
comparative advantage, but that in itself is not such a big achievement.  Even under central planning, the
obviousness  of  comparative  advantage  was  such  that  in  general  terms,  China's  agricultural  trade
corresponded to basic principles of comparative advantage.  What is more striking is the modest and
limited way that agricultural trade has expanded along comparative advantage lines, despite an increase
in foreign trade overall, and the implicit evidence this provides of foregone opportunities for benefit
from  agricultural  trade.  There  is  little  evidence  of  increased  reliance  on  comparative  advantage  in
China’s agriculture.References
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